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Director Dismissal of Shareholder Derivative Suits
Under the Investment Company Act:
Burks v. Lasker
INTRODUCTION

When a federal cause of action is brought in the federal courts
and Congress has not enacted a statute directly governing the issue, the federal courts have sometimes adopted state law to fill the
gap.' This approach was taken in Burks v. Lasker,2 where the Supreme Court held that state law should be used to define the authority of a disinterested director of an investment company to
terminate a shareholder derivative suit brought against other directors under the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("ICA").' This
note will describe the elements generally considered in the determination of whether to adopt state law or to fashion a federal rule
and, in relation to those elements, will examine the Investment
Company Act of 1940 and its recent amendments. The Supreme
Court opinion will then be discussed and criticized. Finally, an alternative approach will be suggested which, in light of the policies
behind the Investment Company Act, calls for the development of
a federal rule as opposed to the adoption of state law.

1. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966); Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum
Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1965); De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1958).
2.

441 U.S. 471 (1979).

3. The Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (1976) [hereinafter "ICA"],
provides in part:
(a) When used in this title, "investment company" means any issuer which(1) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities; (2) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing face-amount certificates of
the installment type, or has been engaged in such business and has any such certificate outstanding; or (3) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of
investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 percentum of
the value of such issuer's total assets ...
on an unconsolidated basis.
4.

Burks V. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 486 (1979).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 11

FEDERAL ADOPTION OF STATE LAW

Generally
If a cause of action is created by a federal statute, it is well settled that the Erie doctrine5 does not apply and state law will not
operate of its own force.' However, when a federal statute does not
adequately address a particular issue, ambiguities are created. To
fill the gap, a court must decide whether state law should apply or
whether a federal rule should be developed. In this situation, some
courts have "fashion[ed] the governing rule of law according to
their own standards."8 Indeed, with respect to providing adequate
relief to those denied a federally created right, federal courts "may
use any available remedy to make good the wrong done."9 Yet
courts are also reluctant to disregard state law where Congress has
not mandated such a result.10 Thus, the remedy chosen by a court
5. The Erie doctrine dictates that state substantive law must be applied in federal courts
on state causes of action. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). This doctrine has been
well received and has led one commentator to remark:
The complimentary concepts-that federal courts must follow state decisions on
matters of substantive law appropriately cognizable by the states whereas state
courts must follow federal decisions on subjects within national legislative power
where Congress has so directed-seem so beautifully simple, and so simply beautiful, that we must wonder why a century and a half were needed to discover them,
and must wonder even more why anyone should want to shy away once the discovery was made.
Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383,
422 (1964).
6. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 476 (1979); see also Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec.
Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942); Dietrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 200 (1940); Board of County
Commissioners of the County of Jackson, Kansas v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349-50
(1939); 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 971 (2d ed. 1961); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS
284 (3d ed. 1976); Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
489, 529 (1954); Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion
in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 799-800
(1957) [hereinafter cited as Mishkin]; Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REV.
1512, 1528 (1967).
7. Ambiguities are especially likely to arise in conjunction with suits brought under the
Investment Company Act. Although the ICA is a federal legislation, investment companies
that fall under its regulation must incorporate under state incorporation statutes.
8. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943). See United States v.
Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979); United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947); Board of County Commissioners of the County of Jackson,
Kansas v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349 (1939).
9. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
10. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-28 (1979); United States v.
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966); De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956). Both
courts and commentators recognize that Congress acts against a background of state law.
Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966); Mishkin, supra note 6, at
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is occasionally the adoption of state law."
When a federal court considers adoption of a state rule, it examines three critical factors: a need for consistency; a need for uniformity; and the congressional intent in enacting the federal statute. Since a federal program is at issue, a rule may not be adopted
that would contravene the purpose of that program.12 Therefore, if
a state law is not in accord with the federal program, two options
are available to a court. First, the state law could be completely
rejected for federal purposes, but remain in effect for state matters. 3 Second, the court could reject the law of a particular state
and fashion a federal rule for that state in its stead. However, this
latter choice might have the anomalous result of state law being
adopted for some states, while a federal rule is in effect in other
states.14 Obviously, then the benefits of consistency are lost.
The need for uniformity also plays an important role in the decision to adopt a state rule or to develop a federal rule. Where it
appears that the federal program must be uniform throughout the
nation, the necessity for the formulation of a single federal rule
becomes clear. 5 Conversely, where the federal program does not
require a nationally uniform rule of law, state law may be
adopted.' 6 Although this "uniformity argument" is considered by
the courts, some commentators believe the factor is inappropriate.
811; H. HART AND H. WESCHLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 435 (1953).
11. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966) (Texas law relied upon to enforce a
coverture clause in a disaster loan contract given by the Small Business Administration);
Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) (suit to enforce an option
and a one-third interest as a joint venture in leases to oil-rich lands); De Sylva v. Ballentine,
351 U.S. 570 (1956) (state law of domestic relations looked to for definition of "child" for
use in the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1976)).
12. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979); Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317
U.S. 173, 176 (1942); Board of County Commissioners v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 350
(1939); McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 835 (3d Cir. 1961); Mishkin, supra note
6, at 805-806.
13. Mishkin, supra note 6, at 805-806.
14. When the court rejects the rule of a particular state and adopts the rule of another
state, the rule of the first state continues to operate as to state matters. Moreover, any state
law that is adopted is, in effect, absorbed into the federal scheme and is not an independent
source for private rights. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957);
Mishkin, supra note 6, at 806.
15. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979); Santa Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977); Mishkin, The Federal "Question" In the District
Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157 (1953); Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REV.
1512, 1528, 1529 (1969); Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of
Decision, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1084, 1091 (1964).
16. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979).
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They suggest that the increasing reliance on centralized government diminishes the importance of the states and harms the fundamental nature of federalism.1 7 Other commentators have noted
that the Supreme Court lacks the time and resources to develop
detailed substantive rules that uniformity requires."
The overriding factor used to determine whether to adopt a state
rule has been congressional intent.' The court must examine not
only whom and in what manner the statute seeks to protect, but
also the specific congressional activity in enacting the law and the
historical background of the legislative scheme.2 0 Once legislative
intent is formulated, the effect of applying the state law to it must
be ascertained.2 1 Only then can the court effectively decide
whether or not to adopt the state rule.
Securities Law
Federal securities regulation has had a great impact on what
previously was considered to be exclusively state corporation law.2"

17. Since our government is based on federalism, national action is, for the most part, an
"exceptional" occurrence in our policy. As one commentator observes: "Indeed, with all the
centralizing growth throughout the years, federal law is still largely an interstitial product,
rarely occupying any field completely, building normally upon legal relationships established
by the states." Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 544-45
(1954).
18. Mishkin, supra note 6, at 813-14.
19. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S.
63 (1966); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957); United
States v. Standard Oil of California, 332 U.S. 301 (1947); Dietrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190
(1940).
20. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975) (the court uses factors such as "a clearly articulated federal right in the plaintiff ....
or a pervasive legislative scheme," in determining
whether to imply a private cause of action); Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384
U.S. 63, 69 (1966) (here, the court notes that any federal statute is "a prime repository of
federal policy and a starting point for federal common law."); Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) (the court looked at the "policy of our national
labor laws" to determine whether to enforce an arbitration clause in a labor contract);
United States v. Standard Oil of California, 332 U.S. 301, 309 (1947) (this court employed a
theory of consent to the application of state law by congressional silence on a matter); Dietrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 200-201 (1940) (the remedy is to be derived from the federal
statute, even where it remains silent on an issue, by looking at its policy).
See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv.
383, 410 (1964); Mishkin, supra note 6, at 812; Note, The Competence of Federal Courts To
Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 HAav. L. REv. 1084, 1091 (1964).
21. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979); United States v.
Standard Oil Co. of California, 332 U.S. 301, 310 (1947); Mishkin, supra note 6, at 812.
22. Federal securities laws have to a great extent generated a "wholly new and far-reaching body of Federal corporation law." In the matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907,
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Yet the federal law is only pervasive, not exclusive.2 s Essentially,
securities laws have been directed at specific practices or problems
such as proxy regulation and disclosure requirements. 4 These
types of regulation do not pre-empt state corporation laws, which
are enacted for other reasons. However, state corporation law has
not been readily adopted by the federal courts and it "is not uncommon for federal courts
to fashion federal law where federal
2
rights are concerned. 5
In determining whether to adopt state law with respect to the
Investment Company Act, the ICA has been distinguished from
previous securities acts. Unlike the other acts, "the 1940 Act operates as a corporation law for investment companies
in many respects. Cognizant of this broad scope of the ICA, courts have specifically rejected the state imposed requirements of demand and
security for expenses in shareholder derivative suits brought under
the statute. The reluctance of courts to adopt state law can best
be understood in light of the historical development of the ICA.
The development of investment companies began in the early

910 (1961); see Kaplan, Corporation Law and Securities Regulation, 18 Bus. LAW. 868
(1963).
23. Fleischer, "FederalCorporationLaw: An Assessment," 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1153
(1965).
24. E.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1976) (designed to provide disclosure in
the registration of securities); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1976) (deals
mainly with regulation of secondary security markets and the registration of brokers and
dealers). See also Kaplan, CorporationLaw and Securities Regulation, 18 Bus. LAW. 868,
873 (1963).
25. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957). See J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964) (determining that there existed an overriding federal interest where violation of preemptive rights was asserted); McClure v. Borne Chem. Corp., 292
F.2d 824, 835 (3d Cir. 1961) (rejecting state security for expenses requirement in shareholder derivative suits).
26. Fleischer, Federal CorporationLaw: An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1146, 1153
n.38 (1965).
27. Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815, 818 (1st Cir. 1964) (demand excused); Chabot v.
Empire Trust Co., 301 F.2d 458, 462 (2d Cir. 1962) (invalidation of indemnity clause); Note,
Stockholders' Derivative Suits: A Federal Question?, 27 IND. L.J. 231, 234 (1951).
Generally, limitations are imposed upon shareholders before they file suit. These limitations include shareholder exhaustion of intra-corporate remedies, establishment of standing,
compliance with state security-for-expense statutes, and the contemporaneous ownership requirement. See generally Note, Derivative Suits: Director Demand Under Rule 23.1 and
Section 36 (b) of the Investment Company Act, 4 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 565 (1976); Note,
The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. CH. L.
REv. 168 (1976). Further, even when suit is filed, the shareholder is subject to defenses such
as willingness on the part of the corporate management to sue, good-faith determination by
the board not to sue, statute of limitations, laches or ratification. Note, A Look At the Derivative Suit, 24 ARK. L. REV. 89, 92 (1970).
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1920's.2 8 Against the background of the stock market boom, the
public sought to invest their money in these investment companies
and investment trusts. 29 In the period between 1927 and 1929, almost 600 investment companies were organized.3 0 Assets of these
companies reached a height of more than $8 billion before the market crash in 1929.31
In the wake of the stock market crash, total assets of the industry dropped to a low of $2 billion in 1932.2 Some of the losses were
due to unrealized depreciation on portfolio securities and general
business decline. However, substantial losses were the direct result
of fund mismanagement and organizer self-dealing.3 3 Fund securi-

28. Promoters of these investing organizations were attracted by the fact that no large
personal outlay of cash was necessary to establish an investment company. An even more
appealing factor was that governmental supervision was lax and that there were no specific
statutory restraints on investment companies. SEC REPORT ON INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES, pursuant to § 30 of the Public Untility Holding Co. Act of 1935, part
III, ch. 1, 3 (1940) [hereinafter cited as REPORT]. These promoters advertised expert management of funds and a lower risk of loss through the ability to purchase and maintain
diversified portfolios. REPORT, Part III, ch. 1, 36-37. However, the advertised advantages of
investment companies never materialized. The investment company funds performed no
better than the common stock index. The failure to achieve such benefits resulted from
abuses in the management of the funds by those in control. REPORT, Part II, Appendix J,
904-06 and supplement V, p. 933 et. seq. (H.R. Doc. No. 70, 76th Cong.).
29. REPORT, supra note 28, Part III, ch. 1, 2.
30. REPORT, supra note 28, Part III, ch. 1, 3; Part II,ch. 2, Table 16, 111 (H.R. Doc. No.
70, 76th Cong.). The 600 investment companies mentioned represented one-half of the investment companies, whose dates of organization were known to the Commission, that were
in existence in 1929. The peak of this accelerated expansion was reached in 1929 when "investment companies were literally being formed at the rate of almost one each business
day." Yearly sales increased from almost $400 million in 1927 to over $3 billion in 1929.
REPORT, supra note 28, Part III, ch. 1, 3; Part II, ch. 2, Table 16, 111 (H.R. Doc. No. 70,
76th Cong.).
31. REPORT, supra note 28, Part III, ch. 1, 2-4; Part I, ch. 3, 35-36 (H.R. Doc. No. 707,
75th Cong.), and Part II, ch. 2, 30-32 (H.R. Doc. No. 70, 76th Cong.).
32. REPORT, supra note 28, Part III, ch. 1, 17; Part II, ch. 2, 32 (H.R. Doc. No. 70, 76th
Cong.).
33. The SEC revealed that control people, such as managers, officers, directors and sponsors, often effected transactions on their own behalf. Such transactions took the forms of
selling personally acquired, unmarketable securities to their investment companies, encouraging the company to take over interests in which they were obligated, or causing the company to extend financing to clients of these insiders. Other forms of mismanagement of
funds surfaced as excessive profits to organizers, failure to diversify portfolios and creation
of investment companies for ulterior purposes. REPORT, supra note 28, Part III, ch. 1, 22 and
47-48. For a detailed description of prevalent abuses, see Tolins, The Investment Company
Act of 1940, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 77 (1940).
To restore some faith in the companies and overcome strong sales resistance by the public, promoters developed the fixed and semi-fixed trusts. These trusts limited management
involvement and offered an interest in the fund which could be redeemed at any time for a
proportion of the net assets of the company. REPORT, supra note 28, Part III, ch. 1, 26-28.
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ties were sold at considerable discounts and investment company
management became widely disfavored by the public.
Although the popularity of investment companies declined, it
was estimated that in 1940, "one out of ten investors in the country" 4 was a participant in an investment company or trust. Because these investors were typically composed of "widely scattered
small security holders, 3 5 it was virtually impossible to make a concerted effort to control the various abuses that were occurring.
Congress realized that earlier securities statutes were inadequate
to deter the abuses and unscrupulous practices prevalent in investment companies.3 Thus, the Investment Company Act of 1940 was
enacted as another in a series of investor-protection statutes.3 "
The ICA is perceived as a broad, comprehensive regulatory
scheme which approaches a corporation law for investment companies." Its scope has been likened to that of federal regulation in

34. REPORT, supra note 28, Part III, ch. 1, 31-32; Part II, ch. 5, 369-71 (H.R. Doc. No. 70,
76th Cong.).
35. REPORT, supra note 28, Part III, ch. 1, 32. Thus, in 1932, the Senate mandated that a
complete investigation of stock exchange practices be prepared by the Committee on Banking and Currency. REPORT, supra note 28, Part III, ch. 1, 47-48; see SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, REPORT on Stock Exchange Practices, SEN. REP. No. 2455 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 339-59 (1934).
See Ansberry, Federal Legislation, Investment Company Act of 1940, 29 GEO. L.J. 614
(1941); Jaretzki, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 WASH. U.L.Q. 303 (1941); SIMPSON, 1(b), or Not 1 (b) . . . ? Recognition of Legislative Intent in JudicialInterpretation of
the Investment Company Act of 1940, 40 GEO. W.L. REV. 890 (1972); THOMAS, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 9 GEO. W.L. REV. 918 (1941); Tolins, The Investment Company
Act of 1940, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 77 (1940); Note, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 41
COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1941); Note, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 50 YALE L.J. 440
(1941), for a more detailed description of the growth of investment companies.
36. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR INVESTMENT
COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
PUBLIC POLICY REPORT]; 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 144-47 (2d ed. 1961).

37.

Congress states in § 1 of the ICA that:
It is hereby declared that the policy and purposes of this title, in accordance with
which the provisions of this title shall be interpreted, are to mitigate and, so far as
is feasible, to eliminate the conditions enumerated in this section which adversely
affect the national public interest and the interest of investors.
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1976).
The broad policy statement had been noted in several court decisions. United States v.
Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315, 1320-21 (9th Cir. 1976); Independent Investor Protective League v.
Securities and Exch. Comm'n., 495 F.2d 311, 312 (2d Cir. 1974); Harriman v. E. I. Du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133, 159 (D. Del. 1975); Securities and Exchange Comm'n.
v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), afl'd, 435 F.2d 510 (2d
Cir. 1970); Breswick & Co. v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
38. Securities and Exch. Comm'n. v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 42 (7th
Cir. 1972); Harriman v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133, 159 (D. Del.
1975); General Time Corp. v. American Investors Fund, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 400, 401
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the banking and insurance industries,3 ' and has been contrasted
with the much narrower reach of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.4o It is by far the most complex of
the federal securities acts." In Burks v. Lasker, however, the Supreme Court was presented an issue not specifically governed by
the ICA.
BURKS v. LASKER

The Factual Background
On February 5, 1973, two shareholders of Fundamental Investors, Inc., ("Fundamental" or the "Fund"), an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940' and
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 403 F.2d 159, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1968); H. HENN, CASES &
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 786-87 (1974).
39. Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), afj'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir.
1961).
40. Id.; Fleischer, Federal Corporation Law: An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146,
1153 n.38 (1965).
41. Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965); see
Krupsky, The Role of Investment Company Directors, 32 Bus. LAW. 1733, 1740 (1977).
However, the ICA utilizes the Securities Acts by requiring investment companies to register with the SEC before public offerings can be made. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-8 (1976). The requirements for registration with the SEC vary according to the
way a company is classified. Tolins, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 CORNELL L.Q.
77, 93 (1940). The ICA divides investment companies into three principal classes: faceamount certificate companies, unit investment trusts and management companies.
"Face-amount certificate companies" issue face amount certificates of the installment
type, while "unit investment trusts" issue only redeemable securities which represent an
undivided interest in a unit of specified securities. "Management companies" consist of all
other investment companies. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-4 (1976).
Management companies are the most common of investment companies and are further
divided by the ICA into open-end, diversified and non-diversified companies. Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1976).These classifications allow investors to readily
determine the kinds of investments that will be made by a particular company.
The required registration statement must include a recitation of investment policy. This
policy must be adhered to until changed by shareholder vote. Investment Company Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (1976). Changes in investment policy include deviations in respect of
concentration of investment in any particular industry or group of industries. Id., § 80a13(a); see 1 H. BLOOMENTHAL, SEcuRrrms AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 1.06 (1972). Improvident changes in policy are guarded against by the requirement that periodic reports
updating the registration statement must be filed with the SEC and sent to shareholders.
Investment Company Act of 1940, 14 U.S.C. § 80a-30 (1976).
Apart from its disclosure requirements, the ICA regulates the management of investment
companies. Id. at § 80a-9. The ICA also prohibits transactions between certain affiliated
persons or underwriters and the investment company itself. Id. at § 80a-17. Moreover, a
shareholder vote is necessary for the approval of advisory contracts, id. at § 80a-15, and the
selection of directors. Id. at § 80a-16.
42. 54 Stat. 789, (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq. (1976)).
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incorporated pursuant to Delaware law, brought a derivative suit
against the Fund's investment adviser, Anchor Corporation
("Anchor")4 3 and several former and present members of the
Fund's board of directors." The dispute arose over Anchor's recommendations to buy and Fundamental's purchase of $20 million
of Penn Central 270-day notes from Goldman, Sachs & Co. in
1969."5 Seven months after the purchase, Penn Central filed for reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act 4" and consequently the
47
notes were not paid on maturity.
The plaintiffs alleged that the Fund's board members and investment adviser failed to make an independent investigation of
the quality and safety of the notes that had been purchased.48 The
defendant directors were charged with violating sections 13(a)(3)
and 36 of the ICA 4" for relying solely on the representations of
Goldman, Sachs & Co. Anchor was charged with violation of section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, and breach of the investment advisers contract. 60 Additionally, all defendants were charged

43. Burks v. Lasker, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Anchor Corporation is a
registered investment adviser under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1
et seq. (1976).
44. Burks v. Lasker, 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
45. Id. at 1174. The Fund purchased the 270-day notes on four separate dates: November 26, December 2, 4 and 8, 1969. Each transaction represented the purchase of $5 million of Penn Central commercial paper.
46. Id. The petition for reorganization was filed pursuant to § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act,
11 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1976).
47. The Fund and three other plaintiffs brought suit against Goldman, Sachs & Co. for
recission of their purchases of the Penn Central Notes. Welch Foods, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs
& Co., 398 F. Supp. 1393 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The suit was settled on behalf of the Fund in
July, 1974. Goldman, Sachs & Co. took back the notes, paid the Fund $5,250,000 and assigned to the Fund an interest in the reorganization proceeds. Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d
1208, 1209 (2d Cir. 1978).
48. Lasker v. Burks, 426 F. Supp. 844, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). There was no dispute that
Anchor never made an independent investigation of Penn Central's financial condition and
despite reports of Penn Central's mounting losses early in 1970, the Fund officers made no
attempt to sell the notes until May. Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d at 1209.
49. Section 13(a)(3) provides that an investment company shall not deviate from its policy in respect to concentration of investments in a particular industry without shareholder
approval. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a)(3) (1976). Former § 36 provides an action for breach of
fiduciary duty. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1976) (as amended); see note 52 infra.
50. Section 206 describes prohibited transactions by investment advisers. 15 U.S.C. §
80b-206 (1976). This article will concentrate on the Investment Company Act as opposed to
the Investment Advisers Act (IAA) due to the recent Supreme Court decision which precludes a private cause of action under § 206 of the IAA. Transamerica Mortgage Advisers,
Inc. v. Lewis, 48 U.S.L.W. 4001 (October 9, 1979) (The Court held that a private cause of
action was not warranted by the language or purposes of the IAA. They also opined that to
allow a private cause of action would undermine well-reasoned limitations on federal court
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with breach of common-law fiduciary duties.5 1
Fundamental's board of directors met to discuss the pending derivative suit. They determined that of the eleven board members,
five directors should act as a quorum of "disinterested directors""

actions by security investors).
51. Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. at 1175.
52. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). The remaining directors were named defendants to the action or affiliated with Anchor. The statutory definition
of "interested person" can be found at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(1976). The ICA adopted the
"unaffiliated director" as its primary safeguard against overreaching by managers and advisers. Conference on Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 739 (1967) (comment by A.
Pomerantz). At least 40% of the board of directors of an investment company could not be
officers or employees of the company or affiliated with its investment adviser. Investment
Company Act of 1940, § 10, 54 Stat. 80 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1976)). Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977). Such
directors were to act as "watchdogs," ensuring that stated investment policies were being
carried out and providing an independent check on management. Conference on Mutual
Funds, supra, at 739. It soon became apparent that the classification of "unaffiliated" person was too narrow. Adequate protection of shareholder interests was not being provided
since one who was not an officer or employee of the investment company but who, nonetheless, had close ties with a company adviser could be classified as an "independent" director.
S. Rep. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1969), reprintedin, [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4897, 4927; Public Policy Report, supra note 36, at 333. Although technically unaffiliated, the director would be partial to the adviser and would hesitate to take any action
against him. S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 32, reprinted in, [1970] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4897, 4927. Such occurrences prompted the observation that:
The affiliated men pick the unaffiliated men. The men who need to be watched
pick the watchdogs to watch them ... But obviously, you know and I know that
if you are choosing an unaffiliated director or an independent director you are not
going to choose anybody who is going to be too hard on you.
Conference on Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 739 (1967) (comment by A.
Pomerantz).
In 1970, Congress amended the ICA and strengthened the independent director safeguard.
Section 2(a)(19), defining the term "interested persons", was added as a substitute for the
deficient term "affiliated person." This term was not, however, used to widen the scope of
sections 10(f) and 17 of the Act. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-547, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-10, 17 (1976). The new term encompasses family members of
affiliated persons as well as those who have beneficial or legal interests in securities issued
by the investment adviser, principal underwriter and their controlling persons. Such "interested" individuals are now precluded from occupying the status of independent director.
See also, Goldberg, Disinterested Directors, Independent Directors and the Investment
Company Act of 1940, 9 Loy. Cm. L.J. 565 (1978). Congress also expanded the relief available for managerial abuse. Former § 36 of the ICA, forbidding "gross abuse of trust," was
amended to forbid "breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct." Investment
Company Amendments Act of 1970, supra, at § 36(a). In addition, a private right of action
under § 36 of the ICA was created for breach of fiduciary duty in setting advisory fees.
Congress added § 36 to make it clear to the court that fund advisers had a fiduciary duty to
the funds they advise. Prior to the enactment of this section, courts required shareholders to
prove mismanagement and waste of corporate assets before recovery could be had for excessive management fees. Galfand v. Chestnutt, 402 F. Supp. 1318, 1325 (1975), affd, 545 F.2d
807 (2d Cir. 1976). Thus, shareholders, as well as the SEC, have been provided with a vehi-
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to decide the Fund's proper course of action. 3 These five were not
affiliated in any way with Anchor, had not been directors at the
time of the events complained of, and were not defendants in the
suit. After retaining outside counsel and reviewing alternative
means of proceeding," the disinterested directors moved to dismiss
the suit" as an exercise of their business judgment.56

cle that allows them to more effectively control abuses of their investment funds. See Note,
Private Rights of Action Against Mutual Fund Investment Advisers: Amended Section 36
of the 1940 Act, 120 U. PA. L. Rav. 143 (1971).
53. Lasker v. Burks, 426 F. Supp. 844, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Brief for Petitioner at 7, 441
U.S. 471. See note 115 infra for the respondent's claim that the directors were not truly
disinterested.
54. Wickers, an officer of both the Fund and Anchor, ascertained that Stanley H. Fuld,
former chief justice of the New York Court of Appeals, would be available to serve as special
counsel to the disinterested director group. The disinterested board members agreed to retain Judge Fuld.
Judge Fuld prepared a memorandum which outlined three alternatives that the board
might pursue: (1) to seek realignment to gain control of the action; (2) move to have the suit
dismissed; (3) maintain a neutral position and allow the suit to proceed. Lasker v. Burks,
404 F. Supp. 1172, 1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
55. Lasker v. Burks, 426 F. Supp. 844 (1977). The directors gave ten reasons for their
decision to dismiss the suit: (1) Little liklihood of success; (2) likely inability for the Fund to
attract and maintain personnel during the pendency of the trial; (3) the necesity of removing Anchor as investment adviser which would cause delay and uncertainty in management;
(4) Anchor had acted in good faith in suggesting the purchase of Penn Central notes; (5)
Anchor had acted prudently in following the general belief that commercial paper was like
cash; (6) other financial institutions had also purchased the Penn Central notes; (7) some
affirmative action should be taken by the Board; (8) Judge Fuld's analysis that Anchor was
not at fault since they are not to be held as insurers; (9) unnecessary litigation costs to the
Fund; and (10) maximum recovery possible was too small to risk the damage to the Fund's
shareholders which the suit may produce. Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1176-77
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
56. The "Business Judgment Rule" provides that directors of a corporation are not liable for mere errors of judgment if they acted in good faith and with due care. There is a
presumption that directors acted in good faith and a party challenging a judgment error
must allege bad faith, conflict of interests, fraud or collusion before a court will interfere
with the internal management of a company. Polin v. Conductron Corp., 552 F.2d 797, 809
(8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977); In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479
F.2d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 1973); Ash v. International Business Mach., Inc., 353 F.2d 491 (3d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); March v. Bank of New York, 272 F. Supp. 636,
639 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 628 (2d Cir. 1968); Warsaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148,
221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (1966); Lewis, The Business Judgment Rule and Corporate Directors'
Liability For Mismanagement, 22 BAYLOR L. Rv. 157, 158, 172 (1970).
Generally, the choice of whether to enforce a corporate cause of action is considered to be
a matter of internal management and falls within the limitations of the business judgment
rule. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 320 (1936); United Copper
Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263 (1917); Hausman v. Buckley,
299 F.2d 696, 702 (2d Cir. 1962).
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Lower Court Opinions
Upon consideration of the motion to dismiss, the District Court
for the Southern District of New York initially held that the minority directors had the power to seek dismissal of the derivative
suit as long as they were "truly disinterested and independent."5
The court then permitted further discovery on this point and allowed the directors to renew their motion to dismiss. Upon rehearing, 8 the court held that the plaintiffs had failed to sustain the
burden of proving that the directors were not truly disinterested."
Thus, the motion to dismiss was granted based upon the business
judgment rule, which presumes that the directors acted in good
faith."0
Plaintiffs appealed this decision on the ground that, under the
ICA, minority directors have no authority to dismiss a nonfrivolous
derivative suit against the fund's majority directors and investment adviser. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized this as a case of first impression. e The court reasoned that
although the ICA was designed to interpose statutorily disinterested directors as a check on majority directors,6 2 Congress did not
intend these disinterested directors to have the final word in determining whether the best interests of the fund would be served by
pressing claims against co-directors and advisers.6 3 Accordingly,
the Second Circuit reversed the district court and held that dismissal by minority directors is against congressional policies and cannot be sustained." The Supreme Court granted certiorarion this
issue.6 5
The Supreme Court Decision
The question confronting the Supreme Court in Burks v.
6 was whether the disinterested directors of an investment
Lasker"
company may terminate a stockholder's derivative suit brought
57. Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
58. Lasker v. Burks, 426 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
59. Id. at 852.
60. Id. at 853. See note 56 supra for a discussion of the business judgment rule.
61. Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1209 (2d Cir. 1978).
62. Id. at 1211.
63. Id. at 1210.
64. Id. at 1208. To form the basis of its opinion, the court focused on the policy behind
the enactment of the Investment Company Act and the practical reality that board members can never be truly "disinterested" as to the actions of their colleagues.
65. Burks v. Lasker, 439 U.S. 816 (1978).
66. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
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against other directors under the Investment Company Act.67
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan first considered the issue of
whether federal common law or state law governs the authority of
a director to dismiss such a suit.as The ICA is silent on this point.
Recognizing that the suit was brought pursuant to a federal
cause of action, the Court cited J.I. Case Co. v. Borak 9 for the
proposition that where a federal statute is controlling, the courts
need not adopt state law. 70 He further acknowledged that in certain areas, federal statutes authorize federal courts to create a
complete body of federal common law. 7 1 Justice Brennan reasoned,
however, that the above principles do not make state law irrelevant
and he concluded that corporation law is one area where federal
72
courts should not develop a federal common law.
Supporting this conclusion, Justice Brennan noted that federal
corporation law regarding directoral power is largely regulatory
and prohibitory in nature and enacted only tangentially to state
law.7 8 In this respect, he reasoned that the regulation of mutual
funds is no different than that of conventional corporations, because "[m]utual funds, like other corporations, are incorported
pursuant to state, not federal law. ' '7 4 Therefore, Justice Brennan
75
held that the ICA did not displace state law.
Although permitting state law to govern might lead to inconsistencies, to Justice Brennan uniformity was not of paramount importance in the area of director dismissal of derivative suits.
Rather, the critical requirement is that the state law meet the
standards necessary to insure that the policies of the Act will be
carried out. To guarantee that the standards are met, Justice

67. 15 U.S.C. § 80a et seq. (1976). See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
68. 441 U.S. at 476. The Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that implied causes
of actions existed and that a derivative action was appropriate as a means for seeking relief.
69. 377 U.S. 426 (1964), cited at, 441 U.S. at 477.
70. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964) (shareholder derivative suit alleging
violation of pre-emptive rights and violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a)
for effecting a merger with a false and misleading proxy statement).
71. 441 U.S. at 477.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 478.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 479. Justice Brennan stated that "it is state law which is the font of corporate
director's powers," and that Congress has never indicated an intention to completely replace
state law whenever a federal cause of action is asserted. As to the mutual fund industry,
Justice Brennan noted that the ICA does not create managerial powers, but rather, seeks to
restrict and control internal management.
76. Id. at 479 n.6.
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Brennan adopted the "consistency test" which mandates that only
state rules consistent with federal policies may be adopted for federal purposes.77
To determine whether a state law permitting director dismissal
of derivative suits is contrary to federal policy, Justice Brennan
next considered the purpose and structure of the ICA. 78 Congress
had been concerned with potential abuse inherent in the structure
of investment companies and Justice Brennan acknowledged that
the relationship between investment advisers and mutual funds
had been plagued with conflicts of interests.79 To control these
conflicts of interest, Congress had provided that at least forty percent of a fund's board of directors must be disinterested.8 0 In reviewing this provision, Justice Brennan emphasized that Congress
intended these independent directors to act as a check on management and to provide a means for the representation of shareholder
interests. He also noted that Congress did not expressly prohibit
board action from cutting off derivative suits as it had in other
sections of the Act."' Justice Brennan further reasoned that there
may be instances where director dismissal of a derivative suit
would be in the best interest of the company. 2 In such cases, dismissal would not contravene the investor-protection policies of the
Act and could be allowed.
Thus, Justice Brennan's holding was twofold. First, Congress did
not intend to absolutely prohibit director termination of all nonfrivolous derivative suits. Second, federal courts should apply state
law to determine the authority of independent directors to terminate nonfrivolous derivative suits "to the extent such law is consistent with the policies of the Investment Company Act."83 Since the
district court had not considered whether the "business judgment
rule" and the "presumption of good faith" were consistent with the

77. Id. at 479-80; See notes 12-14 supra and accompanying text.
78. 441 U.S. at 480-484.
79. Id. at 481. Justice Brennan recognized that such conflicts of interests may justify
some restraints even on disinterested directors but rejected the approach of the appellate
court which stated that directors may never terminate a nonfrivolous suit.
80. See note 52 supra.
81. 441 U.S. at 482-83. Justice Brennan determined legislative intent, in part, by what
Congress did not adopt in the 1970 amendments to the ICA. He noted that Congress did not
require judicial approval before settling claims against insiders, nor did they expressly cut
off directors' power to terminate derivative suits, as they have done in the past.
82. Id. at 481-82.
83. Id. at 486.
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ICA, the case was remanded. 8 '
CRITICISM OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

The Supreme Court's decision that state law should be used to
determine the authority of an independent director to dismiss derivative suits, as long as it is not inconsistent with the policies of
the ICA, is flawed in several respects. Most fundamentally, it is
inappropriate to treat mutual funds and corporations alike simply
because both are created under state law. In addition, the analysis
of the congressional policy behind the ICA and of the needs for
uniformity and consistency should lead to the conclusion that federal common law is necessary.
Mutual Funds and CorporationsDistinguished
Justice Brennan did not consider the unique pervasiveness of
the ICA when he concluded that the federal statute does not displace state law. Instead, he emphasized the fact that mutual funds,
like other corporations, are incorporated under state law.85 Mutual
funds, however, are not like other corporations;86 their corporate
structure is unique in several ways.
First, mutual funds are permitted, under the ICA, to market
their shares continuously and they must be prepared to redeem
outstanding shares at any time. 87 A second feature of mutual funds
is that their assets are composed of cash and securities only. 8
These assets are readily negotiable and afford a greater opportunity for mismanagement and misuse than would be possible in industrial corporations whose assets are largely plants, fixtures and
bulk goods. 89 Third, and perhaps the most striking distinction between mutual funds and conventional corporations, almost all mu84. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480 (1979).
85. Id. at 478.
86. A mutual fund has been described as a mere "shell" which holds a pool of assets
belonging to several investors who, in turn, hold shares in the fund. Tannenbaum v. Zeller,
552 F.2d 402, 405 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977); Fogel v. Chesnutt, 533
F.2d 731, 734-35 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976).
87. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22 (1976); United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 547 (1973).
88. PUBLIC POLICY REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1966); Securities
and Exch. Comm'n v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd,
435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970); H. HENN, CAsEs AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
786-87 (1974); Note, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 272
(1941).
89. Note, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 272 (1941).
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tual funds are externally managed by investment advisers, while
the typical corporation is internally managed. 90 Because of the external management, the interests of shareholder and management
are not always aligned. 9 1 This unique structure is fraught with conflicts of interests,"2 which is the reason Congress separated investment companies from other corporations by enacting the ICA."
CongressionalPolicy
Additional support for not using state law to define the authority of directors is derived from the congressional policy found in
the provisions of the ICA itself. The ICA imposes substantial obligations upon the directors of investment companies that are
greater than the duties imposed upon directors of conventional
corporations. 9'. Because of the external management of mutual
funds, a fund's independent director seldom has effective control
over individual investment decisions. 5 Despite this lack of control,
one of the most important duties imposed upon directors is to
make sure that such investments are made within the limitations
set forth in the company's registration statement. 96 Moreover, un90. Investment advisers manage the investment portfolios and may additionally perform
administrative tasks for the fund. For these services they receive management or advisory
fees which are usually calculated as a percentage of the fund's net assets. Because the investment adviser manages the fund, it is difficult for a fund to sever its relationship with its
adviser. Thus, the "forces of arm's-length bargaining do not work in the mutual fund industry in the same manner as they do in other sectors of the American economy." S. RaP. No.
184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in, [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 4897, 4901.
See also Radmer, Duties of the Directors of Investment Companies, 3 J. CORP. LAW 61,
63 (1977); Note, The Relationship Between the Investment Adviser and the Mutual Fund:
Too Close For Comfort, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 183, 183 (1976).
91. Conflicts may arise as to level of management fees and sales charges as well as to
various aspects of portfolio transactions. Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 405 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977).
92. Id.; Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1976); S. REP. No. 184, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in, [19701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4897; PUBLiC PoucY
REPORT, supra note 36, at 45-46, 64; Radmer, Duties of the Directors of Investment Companies, 3 J. CORP. LAW 61, 63 (1977).
93. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1976) (statement of purpose
and policy). See Note, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 272
(1941).
94. See Radmer, Duties of the Directors of Investment Companies, 3 J. CORP. LAW 61
(1977), for a discussion of such duties.
95. Comment, Duties of the Independent Director in Open-End Mutual Funds, 70
MICH. L. REv. 696, 702 (1972).
96. One commentator has reviewed the duty of mutual fund directors to oversee the
investment made by the investment adviser. He observed that:
As the primary business of a mutual fund is the investment and reinvestment of
its assets, it follows that the most important function of the board of directors is
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like in general corporate law,9 even if the director feels that a fund

objective is unprofitable, he must obtain shareholder approval to
invoke a change in policy.' 8
The shareholder approval for changes in investment policy is a
critical check on management in light of the observation that, generally, the people who organize the funds also act as investment
advisers and are often elected to the board of directors." Reinforcing the importance of this provision, in 1970, Congress strengthened the shareholder's check by providing a private cause of action
against directors for breach of fiduciary duty to the fund. 1°0 Consequently, the ICA imposes a more "fundamental and pervasive"
fiduciary duty upon mutual fund directors than directors of conventional corporations usually bear. 101 Thus, by requiring more
from investment company directors than from directors of conventional corporations, Congress and the courts '02 have indicated a reluctance to allow state standards to dictate directoral responsibilito make certain that these operations are carried out competently and within the
scope of applicable limitations both governmental and self-imposed.
Jaretzki, Duties and Responsibilities of Directors of Mutual Funds, 29 L. & CONtEMP.
PROS. 777, 783 (1964). See also Radmer, Duties of the Directors of Investment Companies,
3 J. CoRP. LAW 61, 81-83 (1977).
97. Comment, Duties of the Independent Director in Open-End Mutual Funds, 70
MICH. L. Ray. 696, 702 (1972).
98. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13 (1976).
99. There is, thus, a blending of the duties of the investment adviser and director. See
Modesitt, The Mutual Fund-A Corporate Anomaly, 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1252 (1967);
Note, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees and the New Standardof Fiduciary Duty-Interpreting
the 1970 Mutual Fund Act, 56 CoRmLL L. Rzv. 627 (1971); Note, The Relationship Between the Investment Adviser and the Mutual Fund: Too Close For Comfort, 45 FORDHAM
L. REv. 183 (1976); Note, The Mutual Fund and its Management Company: An Analysis of
Business Incest, 71 YALE L.J. 137 (1961), for general comment on this "incestuous"
relationship.
100. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 15 U.S.C. §
80a-35 (1970). See note 52 supra.
101. Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971). See
Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 802 (1971) (requiring not honesty alone, but the punctillo of an honor); Galfand v. Chestnutt, 402 F.
Supp. 1318, 1325 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), afl'd, 545 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1976).
This high standard of fiduciary duty is matched by an equally stringent requirement of
disclosure. Because even independent directors are dependent upon the adviser and affiliated directors for statistical and accounting information, courts have imposed a higher duty
of disclosure upon investment company directors than upon directors of conventional corporations. Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 376 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971);
Note, Private Rights of Action Against Mutual Fund Investment Advisers: Amended Section 36 of the 1940 Act, 120 U. PA. L. Rav. 143, 145-46 (1971).
102. Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337, 1345 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 802
(1971); Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 421 (2d Cir. 1961).
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ties of mutual funds.
Uniformity and Consistency
In enacting the ICA, Congress specifically declared that, "the activities of [investment] companies, extending over many States
. . .make difficult, if not impossible . . . effective State regulation
of such companies in the interest of investors .... "108 Justice
Brennan acknowledged this congressional declaration but gave it
only cursory treatment in a footnote to his opinion.'" Considering
the uniformity and consistency factors together, he determined
that the enforcement problem expressed by Congress would be obviated by the availability of private causes of action in federal
courts combined with the requirement that the state law used by
the court be consistent with the policies of the ICA. 10 5 Any state
law that failed to meet the standards set forth in the ICA would be
precluded from use by the federal courts.1 0 6
This rationale of adopting state law only if it is consistent with
the policy of the ICA is, in effect, the long road to fashioning a
federal common law rule. If, for example, it is determined that the
policy of the ICA dictates that director dismissal should be allowed
where the interest of the company will be benefited, those states
whose laws prohibit dismissal will be inconsistent with the policy
of the Act. Their laws, thus, will not be applied by the federal
courts. A federal rule that allows director dismissal will have to be
created and used instead. In addition, even the states that permit
director dismissal might allow it in a situation inconsistent with
the ICA. Then, the state law would have to be modified. This approach not only creates the problem of determining which law applies, but the eventual outcome will be that one rule, allowing termination of the suit, is created as a "federal" rule.
In light of the foregoing discussion, it seems clear that the
Court's directive to apply state law is both inappropriate and ineffective. In determining whether a disinterested director should be
allowed to terminate a derivative suit brought against other directors under the Investment Company Act, a federal rule is
necessary.

103.
104.
105.

15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(a)(5)(1976).
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 479 n.6 (1979).
Id.

106. Id.
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AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

The Supreme Court should have taken a more direct approach,
fashioning a federal rule to resolve the issue of director dismissal of
derivative suits. A combination of two suggested approaches to this
issue would produce an effective resolution to the problem.
One commentator suggested that the Supreme Court should employ a two-prong test: "(1) whether the independent directors' decision was a reasonable exercise of their business judgment," and
(2) whether the directors were actually independent. 107 The failure
to satisfy either of these factors would preclude director dismissal
of the suit.
The first factor is similar to the business judgment rule.""8 The
test is whether prudent, independent directors would terminate
the derivative suit "under the circumstances prevailing at the time
of the decision."'' 0 9 In determining reasonableness, adequate disclosure of the facts to the independent directors would be crucial.
Where it could be shown that relevant information was not made
available, a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness would be
raised. 10
The second factor, independence, focuses on whether the independent directors comprised a majority or minority of the board."'
Where the independent directors constituted only a minority, a
presumption of non-independence would be raised."

2

In that situa-

tion, the burden of proof would be borne by the party seeking
dismissal."'
Under this suggested test, the decision to terminate the derivative suit in Burks seems to have been reasonable. Not only was
107. Note, Mutual Fund Independent Directors,Puttinga Leash On the Watchdogs, 47
FORDHAM L. REv. 568, 580 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Mutual Fund Directors]. This approach was suggested as a means to reconcile the deficiencies of the district court and appellate court decisions.
108. See note 60 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the business judgment
rule.
109. Mutual Fund Directors,supra note 107, at 581.
110. Id. at 581-82. See also note 101 supra.
111. Id. The factor of independence would additionally delve into the relationships of
the directors in question to the investment adviser and other directors of the" fund. The
district court inquired into the independence of the directors and determined that their
affiliations with other boards managed by the same adviser was insufficient to disqualify
them as independent directors. Burks v. Lasker, 426 F. Supp. 844, 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
112. Mutual Fund Directors,supra note 107, at 580. Such a presumption is raised because a group comprised of a minority of a board of directors is often suceptible to control
by majority members of the board.
113. Id.
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there disclosure of all pertinent information, but outside counsel
was retained as an impartial source of advice.' Moreover, it was
determined that the potential gain from the litigation did not outweigh the possible detriment to the Fund. n5 Thus, the termination
of the pending suit seemed a prudent business decision.
Notwithstanding the apparent reasonableness of the directors
decision, dismissal of the derivative suit would be denied. Because
the independent directors comprised only a minority of the board,
a presumption of non-independence automatically would arise.
This presumption would not be rebutted since it was the defendant directors who screened potential nominees for the board and
who selected new board members after having been notified of the
derivative suit. 6 Thus, it is likely that the interested directors exerted some influence over the disinterested directors such that impartial judgment might have been impaired.11 7 Since the directors
were not independent, the safeguards provided to shareholders by
the ICA broke down. Therefore, the shareholder derivative action
was the only means for the shareholders to protect their interests" 8 and the suit should not have been dismissed.
A second approach to the director dismissal issue was recently

114. See note 54 supra.
115. See note 55 supra.
116. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). Petitioners claimed that the testimony on this
point showed that none of the five "disinterested directors" were related to any of the defendants by blood or marriage; that none knew more than two of the eleven directors at the
time that they joined the Board, and that none had a personal stake in the outcome of their
deliberations. Brief for Petitioner at 15, Id.
However, Respondent countered with persuasive evidence that:
(1) the so-called quorum was made-up of a minority of the Board who were defendants in the pending litigation;
(2) the five directors selected to Fundamental's board were simultaneously selected as directors of five other funds managed by Anchor;
(3) the directors selected had longstanding business and social relationships with
one or more of the defendants;
(4) Anchor supplied office space and equipment to the Fund at no charge as well
as paid all of the salaries of the Fund's officers, executives and administrative
personnel;
(5) Anchor held all key executive positions; and
(6) defendants, as a majority of the Board, controlled the Fund's proxy machinery. Since no shareholder owned more than one percent of the Fund's stock, it was
not feasible for the minority to commence a proxy contest to assert control.
Brief for Respondent at 8-9, Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 474 (1979); Mutual Fund Directors,
supra note 107, at 583 (citing Petitioner's Brief at 64-66, 66-68).
117. Id.
118. See note 27 supra.
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used by a Delaware Court of Chancery in Maldonado v. Flynn."'e
The opinion was a response to the surge of cases, 20 after Burks,
brought by directors of corporations seeking the dismissal of derivative suits pending against them. The Delaware court held that
where wrongdoing by defendant directors is charged, a committee
of independent non-party directors, appointed by the defendant
directors after the commencement of a suit, may not terminate the
litigation by use of the business judgment rule. 2 ' The business
judgment rule, the court reasoned, is only a defensive rule which
directors use as a shield to oppose shareholder attacks on the directors' decisions.122 Nothing in the rule creates an independent affirmative power that permits directors to terminate a shareholder
derivative suit."1 The court also mentioned, in dicta, that even if
the business judgment rule were relevant to the dismissal issue
presented, the concepts of "fairness and fiduciary duty" mandate
that the defendant directors bear the burden of proving the inde1 24
pendence of their select committee.
The two-prong test suggested as an alternative to Burks would
be more effective if the Delaware court's dicta concerning the satisfaction of the directors fiduciary duty12 5 were added as an element
to be considered with the reasonable business judgment portion of
the test. Since the standard of duty is higher for the mutual fund
126
it
director than for the director of a conventional corporation,
would seem reasonable to afford it greater weight than the test implies. If fiduciary duty is considered an element of reasonableness,
the burden of proof would be on the director to show that his actions were proper. 2 7 Only upon showing of propriety of director

119. SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) K-I (March 18, 1980).
120. Lewis v. Anderson, - F.2d - (9th Cir.), FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97, 153 (Oct. 29,
1979); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 728 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, - U.S.
-, 100 S. Ct. 670 (1980); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); Gall
v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Problems with the Burks opinion are
already apparent from the conflicting decisions within, as well as among, the several states.
See Muldonado v. Flynn, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) V97, 260 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1980)(companion case to the Delaware chancery case described. The New York court interpreted Delaware law as allowing dismissal).
121. Maldonado v. Flynn, SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) K-i, K-5 (March 18, 1980).
122. Id. at K-2.
123. Id. at K-3.
124. Id. at K-6.
125. See notes 100-01 supra and accompanying text.
126. Id.
127. Such a shift of the burden of proof would be extremely helpful to the shareholder
because under the business judgment rule the shareholder would have to prove bad faith on

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 11

action could the business judgment rule come into play.
In Burks v. Lasker, it is not likely that the directors would sustain the burden of proving the propriety of their actions. Not only
was no independent investigation of the Penn Central notes undertaken, 128 but the directors also failed to obtain the shareholder approval necessary to change the investment policy of the Fund."'
Thus, the directors effectively purchased the 270-day notes in contravention of the protections set forth in the ICA.
This addition of a fiduciary duty element may be the edge
needed to offset the presumption of reasonableness of director action inherent in the business judgment rule. This approach would
be very effective because it allows the freedom necessary for truly
independent directors to manage efficiently a mutual fund, while it
also incorporates the protection of the Investment Company Act.3 0
CONCLUSION

The effect of the Supreme Court decision in Burks v. Lasker is
likely to be twofold. Despite the stated objective to adopt state
law, the outcome will be the emergence of one "federal" rule of law
defining the authority of disinterested directors of investment
companies to terminate a shareholder derivative suit as an exercise
of their business judgment. Yet the initial deference to state law
may adversely affect the development of strong federal protections
intended by the enactment of the Investment Company Act.
Second, when shareholders bring a derivative suit against some
the part of the director before enduring a motion to dismisss. See note 60 supra; Perlman v.
Feldman, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
128. Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1209 (2d Cir. 1978).
129. The neglect to obtain shareholder vote for the change in investment policy in
purchasing securities in a different industry was one of the allegations against Fundamental's directors. Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
130. There is already evidence that the Supreme Court decision in Burks v. Lasker is
being limited to its facts. In Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980), shareholders
brought a derivative suit against all of the company's directors for a violation of § 14(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. They alleged that the directors used misleading proxy
statements to gain shareholder approval of a stock option plan that would benefit the directors. The directors moved to dismiss the derivative suit claiming exercise of their business
judgment and relied on Burks v. Lasker for dismissal.
In denying the motion, the Galef Court distinguished Burks v. Lasker. The Court noted
that in Lasker, there had been five "disinterested" directors, not named in the suit, while in
Galef, the entire board of directors were named defendents. Moreover, the Galef court
noted that the determination that the policies of the Investment Company Act do not justify a flat rule that directors may never terminate a nonfrivolous derivative suit, does not
necessarily infer that such is the case pertaining to section 14(a). The Galef court then held
that § 14(a) claims were not subject to business judgment dismissal.
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of the directors of an investment company, the defendant directors
can establish a committee of "independent directors" who may
then apply their business judgment and rely upon Lasker for dismissal of the suit. The result will be that shareholders will either
begin to sue all of the directors on the board or risk dismissal of
their suit by the director or directors not named as defendants.
Without stronger guidelines set by the federal courts to safeguard
the policies of the Investment Company Act, abuses of the power
to terminate nonfrivolous derivative suits might become yet another one of the many abuses already recognized as prevalent in
the investment company industry.
LISA

D. MARCO

